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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
N. J. MEAGHER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.UINTAH GAS CO~IP ANY and
VALLEY FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY,
D-efendants,

Civil No. 7723

RAY PHEBUS·, ASHLEY VALLEY
OIL COMP_.._~NY, PAUL STOCK and
JOE T. JUHAN,
Defendants and .Appellants.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF AND STATEMEN·T
OF AMICUS CURIAE

Since filing his brief herein amicus curiae has, with
his associates, devoted considerable time in the search
for precedents and in reflecting on the questions involved
in the failure of the lower court to conform to the mandate.
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Scores of cases were found, a few of them are included herein. This supplemental brief and statement is
tendered out of a sense of duty to the Court. I cannot
state that there are no authorities against the position
taken on the mandate feature, but I can state that in our
search, which I assure the Court was diligent, we found
none.
Preliminarily, amicus curiae, paraphrasing the language used in respondent's reply brief, (pps. 1 and 2)
says:
1. Rehearing is granted when a decisive question
has been overlooked by the opinion of this Court, and
2. Where a new and important principle of la-\v is
involved.
THE MANDATE.
In the original appeal (No. 6972, decision filed October 27, 1947, 185 P. 2d 747) only two questions were
considered and solved by this Court :
" ( 1) Does the general provision of the contract to the effect that its purpose is solely and
only for the mining and operating for oil and gas
contemplate exploration beyond the specific re-quirements of the contract to avoid its termination rand (2) Has there been an abandonment of
the gas rights under the lease~"
This Court then determined that the lease had not
been forfeited nor abandoned. The cause was rem·anded
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to the lo"'"er court for proceedings to conform to the
op1n1on.
In Phebus et al. t'. Dunford, J·ndge, et al. (No. 7187,
decision filed November 8, 1948, 198 P .2d 973), this Court
again sets out the original mandate and says :
'~For

a foundation for that direction we
n1erely invite attention to the citation above, and
the two questions (issues) decided therein." (Emphasis added).
From this it is sho\vn that the mandate is specific
and could have been executed and conformed to with a
slight effort by the lower court.
The mandate did not grant respondent a new trial
on any issue; nor did it direct a rehearing on any issue;
nor "\Yere new pleadings directed or permitted. There is
no uncertainty in it. No ambiguity. The two issues in
the original appeal and in the mandamus proceedings. had
been spelled out. What could the lower court do to proceed in conformity with the opinion~
The trial judge in his memorandum decision clearly
demonstrated that he must have misapprehended the
meaning of the mandate. He held that it was his duty
under the mandate to determine all of· the rights of all
of the parties under the lease AI, as modified by A5
(Mem. Dec. p. 28). The lower court holds that by the
reversal of· its judgment by this Court a new situation
was presented. The trial judge then states:
"The Supreme Court directed further proceedings in conformity with that situation, * * *."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

Innocently enough the lower court then interprets
the mandate as a direction for it:

"* * * to determine the parties' rights under
the lease. The plaintiff was compelled to accept
that interpretation, and moved to have his rights,
as well as the rights of the defendants thereunder,
determined." (Mem. Dec. p. 28).
On page 30 of its memorandum decision, again referring to the remittitur, the lower court says that the
remittitur ordered further proceedings because, it may
be assumed, the "plaintiff has obtained absolutely nothing by this proceedings (sic) to date." Thereupon, at
page 36 of the memorandum decision, the lower court
comes to this conclusion:
"The Court having heretofore held under the
mandate of the Supreme Court, that its duty is
to determine and settle the rights in the property
under AI and A5, it is then necessary to determine
just what interest the parties presently have
under those instruments."
Commencing on page 52 of the memoranduln decision
the lower court proceeds to outline a decree which is
ordered entered.

"* * * prescribing, defining and adjudicating
the rights of the parties to this action in and to
the 480 acres of land in issue * * * ~"
Then it is that the lower court adjudicates and determines all of the rights under all of the exhibits in
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5
favor of and against (1) the plaintiff, N. J. Meagher,
(2) defendant Ashley \'"ailey Oil Company, (3) defendant
Ray Phebus, (4) defendant Paul Stock, (5) defendant
Joe T. Juhan, (6) defendant \'alley Fuel Supply Company, and (7) defendant lTintah Gas Company.
On second appeal the opinion states:
··Since our for1ner decision, three claims were
allowed to be brought into the case :"
1) By amendm·ent l\1eagher asserted claim
to an oil royalty assigned in 1930 to Stock and
Phebus. :2) By counterclaim Stock asserted a onehalf interest in the operating rights to the· 440
acres. 3) By amended reply Meagher claimed that
one-half interest. See Op. par. 2.
The record shows Stock's counterclaim came after
Meagher's amended reply. The sequence in the opinion
misleads the reader.
The lower court also awarded operating rights in the
N. 40 to Meagher, which this Court awarded to Ashley
Valley Oil Company (with modification).
The case was again remanded :

" * * * with instructions to modify the conelusions of law and judgment to conform to this
decision, * * *."
Mistakenly, the lower court had wholly disregarded
the terms of the first mandate.
"The decision of the lower court is reversed,
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and the case remanded to that court for proceedings to conform to this opinion."
The lower court, of course, had no jurisdiction to
allow the three new claims to be brought into the case
nor had it jurisdiction to award to Meagher or Ashley
Valley Oil Company the N. 40. Disregarding its jurisdiction limitations, it sought to and did litigate all of
the issues between all of the parties growing out of lease
AI as modified by A5.
Nothing demonstrates more clearly the utter failure
of the lower court to follow the n1andate than the "Statement of Points" found in Respondent's Answer to Petition for Rehearing, p. a. It is there asseTted that nine
new decisions were made-correctly made.
\Vhen this Court entered its judgment in the first
appeal the "Hour of Decision" had passed. Presently we
are not concerned whether these decisions were made
correctly or incorrectly. The error lies in making them.
They were not made in conformity with the opinion and
judgment of this Court in the first appeal. Neither were
the three new claims allowed to be brought in within the
terms of that mandate. Nor, under the mandate, could
the lower court award the N. 40 to Meagher or to Ashley
Valley Oil Company. In vain we search the mandate for
authority or instruction for either.
·The mandate of the first decision and the mandate
of the second decision are substantially the san1e. The
lower court could have conformed to the first mandate
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as it is now instructed to conform to the second mandate.
If the lower court treats the second mandate as it did the
first mandate, the end of nine years of wearisome litigation is not yet in sight.
It is becoming clearer and clearer that everything
done by the lower court after remittitur should be vacated, set aside and held for naught.
In Frye c. King County, 289 P. 18 (Wash.) the court
says:
HThe mandate of this court is binding on the
superior court, and must be strictly followed.
Having reversed the judgment and remanded the
case to the trial court, with instructions to enter
judgment in accordance with our opinion, 'that
order is conclusive and no judgment different
therefrom can be entered by the trial court. Volume 2, p. 89. R.C.L."
In
says:

i~cClung

v. Harris, 65 P. 941 (Okla.), the court

"When the mandate from this court reached
the court below, the plaintiff presented an
amended petition, setting up facts which occurred
prior to the trial of the original case appealed to
this court, and asked leave to- file the same, and
to be permitted to litigate the additional matter
set up in such amended ·petition. The plaintiff's
application to amend was denied, and from this
orde-r and the judgment entered by the district
court pursuant to the mandate from this court
plaintiff appeals, and the defendant in error
moves the dismissal of such appeal.
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"In our judgm®t, the motion should be sustained. It was the duty of the plaintiff to plead
all of the facts which would afford him any relief
in the case when it was tried the first time in the
court below., This court took the record as it
found it, and from that record the defendant was
clearly entitled to the relief granted, and, under
the facts disclosed by the case-made, in equity
and under the authorities, no other judgment
should have been rendered. The trial court, under
the mandate, had no ·discretion in the premises,
* * *"
Some authorities hold that the function of the lower
court, after mandate, is merely ministerial. See Kimpton
v. Jubilee Mining Company, 55 P. 918 (Mont.) ; Woodward v. Perkilns, 171 P.2d 997 (Mont.); Columbia Mining
Comparn.y v. Holter, 1 (Mont.) 429, where the court said:
"The mandate was the imperative command
of the supervisory court to a subordinate court.
The court below was powerless to disobey."
The parties are not entitled to introduce, and the
court to which the cause has been remanded has no
authority to entertain, new issues. Illinois v. Illinois
Central Railroad Company, 184 U.S·. 77, 46 L. ed. 440.
"The inferior court is bound by the decree
as the law of the case, and must carry it into
execution, according to the mandate. They cannot vary it, or examine it for any other purpose·
than execution, or give any other or further relief,
or review it upon any matter decided on appeal
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See also Powerine Co. v. Zion's Sav. Bank
& Trust Co., 106 Utah 384, 148 P.2d 807 and
Forbes v. Butler, 73 Utah 522, 275 P. 772.
A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE OR OF
JURISDICTION MAY BE RAIS·ED BY THIS
COURT SUA SPONTE.
(A)

By amicus curiae.

Jlorrow v. Morrow, 156 P. 2d 827 (Nev.):
·~Defendant

insists that the amicus curiae
was \Yithout authority to make the motion to
dismiss the appeal. Our consideration of this contention satisfies us tnat he vvas competent to make.
it. The order appointing him because of the
important question involved, did not limit him
exclusively to advising the· c.ourt as to that question, as defendant contends. We are likewise
satisfied, after examining the record, together
with the evidence introduced by the amicus curiae·
on the hearing of the motion that the appeal
should be dismissed.
"First, as to the competency of the movent,
it has been held in this and other jurisdictions
that it is within the province of an attorney as
an amicus. curiae, to move to dismiss an action
on the ground that it is collusive or fictitious. ·
Haley v. Eureka County Bank, 21 Nev. 127, 26
P. 64, 12 L.R.A. 815; Muskogee Gas, etc., Co.
v. Haskell, 38 Okl. 358, 132 P. 1098, Ann. Cas.
1915A, 190; Ward v. Alsup, 100 Tenn. 619, 46
S.W. 573; Judson v. Flushing Jockey Club, 14
Misc. 350, 36 N.Y.S.. 126, 128; 2 Am. Jur. pp.
681-2, sec. 6. In the Nevada case, Haley v. Eureka
County Bank, sup·ra, the court held that an attorney as amicus curiae may move to dismiss an
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in the case when it was tried the first time in the
court below. , This court took the record as it
found it, and from that record the defendant was
clearly entitled to the relief granted, and, under
the facts disclosed by the case-made, in equity
and under the authorities, no other judgment
should have been rendered. The trial court, under
the mandate, had no discretion in the prem1ses,
* * *"

Some authorities hold that the function of the lower
court, after mandate, is merely ministerial. See Kimpton
v . Jubilee Mining Company, 55 P. 918 (Mont.); WoodUJ'ard' v. Perkins, 171 P.2d 997 (Mont.); Columbia Mining
Company v. Holter, 1 (Mont.) 429, where the court said:
"The mandate was the imperative command
of the supervisory court to a subordinate court.
The court below was powerless to disobey."
The parties are not entitled to
court to which the cause has been
authority to entertain, new issues.
Central Railroad Company, 184 U.S.

introduce, and the
remanded has no
Illinois v. Illinois
77, 46 L. ed. 440.

"The inferior court is bound by the decree·
as the law of the case, and must carry it into
execution, according to the 1nandate. They cannot vary it, or examine it for any other purpose·
than execution, or give any other or further relief,
or review it upon any matter decided on appeal
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for error apparent, or intermeddle with it, further
than to settle so much as has been remanded."
A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE OR OF
JURISDICTION nfAY BE RAIS-ED BY THIS
COURT SUA SPONTE.
(A)

By amicus curiae.

Morrow v. Morrow, 156 P. 2d 827 (Nev.):

"Defendant insists that the amicus curiae
was \Yithout authority to make the motion to
dismiss the appeal. Our consideration of this contention satisfies us th_at he was competent to make
it. The order appointing him because of the
important question involved, did not limit him
exclusively to advising the· court as to that question, as defendant contends. We are likewise
satisfied, after examining the record, together
with the evidence introduced by the amicus curiae
on the hearing of the motion that the appeal
should be dismissed.
"First, as to the competency of the movent,
it has been held in this and other jurisdictions
that it is within the province of an attorney as
an amicus curiae, to move to dismiss an action
on the ground that it is collusive or fictitious. ·
Haley v. Eureka County Bank, 21 Nev. 127, 26
P. 64, 12 L.R.A. 815; Muskogee Gas, etc., Co.
v. Haskell, 38 Okl. 358, 132 P. 1098, Ann. Cas.
1915A, 190; Ward v. Alsup, 100 Tenn. 619, 46
S.W. 573; Judson v. Flushing Jockey Club, 14
Misc. 350, 36 N.Y.S.. 126, 128; 2 Am. Jur. pp.
681-2, sec. 6. In the Nevada case, H_aley v. Eureka
County Bank, sup-ra, the court held that an attorney as amicus curiae may move to dismiss an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
action as collusive. The court said (21 Nev. 127,
26 P. 68):
'It is not only the right, but the duty, of
an attorney of the court, if he knows or has
reason to believe that the time of the court is
being taken up by the trial of a feigned issue,
to so inform the judge thereof; and it is discretionary with the court to stay proceedings, make due inquiry, and, if the facts warrant the suggestion, then dismiss the case.' "
(B)

By the Court sua sponte.

Hardy v. Meadows, 71 Utah 255, 264 P. 968.

"But matters of substance or of subject-n1atter jurisdiction may not be waived. These need
neither objection, exception, nor assignments of
error. With respect to them courts, sua sponte,
open the record and take notice of defects of
substance and of subject-matter jurisdiction without regard to the wishes of either party named
on the record."
In Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall. 466, 23 L. ed. 70, where
there was lack of jurisdiction, the court said:
"In the present case the objection was not
made by demurrer, plea or answer, nor was it
suggested by counsel; nevertheless if it clearly
exists it is the duty· of the court sua sponte to
recognize and give it effect."

THE STOCK PAPER.
The bargain made by Jacob with Esau would not
be condoned by this Court.
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Esau knew that by the very terms of that bargain
he could never enjoy his inheritance. A court of justice
kno\YS other,Yise. The bargain lacked adequacy of consideration. So also 'Yas it coercive.
For an acco1nmodation Stock gave a paper to
:Jieagher. nleagher asked for the paper to quiet title.
He then used it -to show forfeiture and abandonment.
He no'v claims the paper to reap for himself a sum of
1noney in excess of $700,000.00.
The hardship is so flagrant, the misadventure so in
doubt, the oppression so apparent, the deal so unconscionable as to appall the Court and outrage the feelings
of men seeking to do and receive right. Cordoza once
said:
"When all is said and done justice is the
synonym of an aspiration, a mood of exultation,
a yearning for what is fine or high."
When Esau did not perish Jacob should have returned the inheritance. When the Stock paper was found
to be so valuable the slightest tinge of morality would
have dictated its prompt return. Respondent has this
dubious satisfaction "* * * nevertheless, being crafty,
I caught you with guile." 2 Cor. 12:16.
Because a decisive question has been overlooked
and because an etror has been made with respect to an
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important principle of law, the writer firmly believes
that a rehearing should be granted.
· Respectfully submitted,
BURTON W. MUSSER
Amicus Curire
307 Utah Oil Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
April27, 1953
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